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Summary findings
Kawai, Newfarmer,  and Schmukler investigate the origins of  magnitude  of the crisis or  contagion,  and  wheni
the East  Asian  crisis  and its contagion,  examine  the channels  of  private creditors are not amenable to coordination,
contagion,  and discuss  policy  recommendations.  They make  some involuntary private involvement may be
detailed  recommendations  in the context of nine general  needed too.
lessons  learned from the East Asian  crisis.  * Keep in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all
monetary and fiscal stance for responding to crises
Preventing  crises and contagion  and contagion.
* Avoid large current  account deficits financed
through short-term private capital inflows.  Resolving the systecnic consequences of crises  and
* Aggressively  regulate and supervise financial systems  contagionz
to ensure that banks and nonbank financial  * Move swiftly to establish domestic and international
institutions manage risks prudently.  mechanisms for dealing with the assets and liabilities
* Put in place incentives for sound corporate  finance  of nonviable banks and corporations.
to prevent high leverage ratios and overreliance on  * Cushion the effects of crisis on low-income groups
foreign borrowing.  through social policies to ameliorate the inevitable
social tensions associated xvith  adjustment.
Managing crises and contagion
* In the context of sound policies, niobilize timely  Developing an effective regional financial architecture
external liquidity of sufficient magnitude to restore  Improve mechanisms for preventing, managing, and
market confidence.  resolving crises and contagion at the regional level in
* At times of crisis, "bail in" private foreign creditors.  ways consistent with improvements in the global
When official resources are too limited for the  financial architecture.
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The recent  financial crises  in  the  emerging market  economies have attracted
considerable attention from  policymakers, economists, and  the  financial press. The
currency crisis that originated in Thailand  was rapidly transmitted to Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Korea; and its impact was also felt in other developed and emerging
markets. A similar shock threatened Latin America and the rest of the world when the
Mexican peso was devalued in 1994 (the Tequila crisis). In 1998 and 1999, the currency
devaluations in Russia (August 1998) and Brazil (January 1999) have unleashed a new
wave of financial volatility. The fact that the currency crises in the 1990s, most notably
the one in East Asia, were clustered suggests that the crises in different countries were
related.
Financial crises, characterized as currency (i.e., balance of payments) crises and
banking crises, have long been studied. A currency crisis takes place when there is a run
on official foreign exchange reserves, thus exerting downward pressure on the exchange
rate in the economy. The "first-generation"  models of currency crises (as exemplified by
Krugman, 1979) argue that a deterioration in economic fundamentals leads to a crisis in
the external account. The "second-generation"  models of currency crises (as exemplified
by Obstfeld, 1986) argue that currency crises can occur even in  countries with sound
fundamentals owing to  self-fulfilling expectations. In a world of "multiple equilibria,"
countries with relatively sound fundamentals  may end up with a bad equilibrium; that is,
a currency crisis. Financial crises have also been studied from the perspective of the
banking sector and are associated with a run on bank deposits. Like currency crises, bank
Iruns can originate from fundamental weaknesses of several commercial banks or from
self-fulfilling  expectations (as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
Currency and banking crises  (sometimes called the  "twin  crises")  tend to  be
associated with each other and often take place together. There are several possible links
between banking and currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
*  Currency crises can cause banking crises. A rapid depletion of foreign exchange
reserves under a  fixed exchange rate regime typically forces the central bank to
contract high  powered money, thereby reducing monetary aggregates, increasing
bankruptcies, and thus inducing banking crises.
- Banking crises can cause currency crises. When investors believe that serious banking
crises are imminent, they will reshuffle their portfolios away from domestic assets
and toward foreign assets. When central banks inject liquidity into the financial
market to bail out the troubled banks, excessive money creation can lead to currency
speculation  and a run on foreign exchange reserves.
*  Currency and banking crises can result from common factors. When an economic
boom is financed by a surge both in large capital inflows and in bank credit, the end
of the boom tends to be  accompanied by both currency and banking crises. See
McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Krugman (1998a).
Before the episodes of the 1990s, financial crises were, in principle, considered as
events occurring in individual countries. But the Mexican crisis of  1994-95, the East
Asian  crisis  of  1997-98,  and the  Russian crisis  of  1998 had  strong  contagion (or
spillover) effects in other countries; that is a crisis in one country was rapidly transmitted
to the rest of the world. The global extent of the recent crises agitated the debate on the
2causes of the crises and contagion. Some authors argue that the crisis which originated in
Thailand  was transmitted to other countries owing to fundamental linkages and channels.
This view was expressed by, among others, Krugman (1998a), the IMF (1998a, 1998b),
Summers (1999), and Corsetti et al. (1998). These authors argue that the East Asian
countries financed unproductive investments because of implicit government guarantees
and a "crony capitalism." Such unproductive investment generated vulnerabilities both in
the real and financial sectors of the economies. At  the same time, the  governments
accumulated  large contingent liabilities  because of the need to protect depositors of banks
and other financial institutions. The strong trade linkages among these economies helped
to propagate the crisis throughout the region.
On the other hand,  other authors, such as Radelet and  Sachs (1998a,  1998b),
Krugman  (1999),  and  Furman  and  Stiglitz  (1998),  emphasize weaknesses  in  the
international  financial markets as the major source of a crisis and contagion. Their views
argue that the economic prospect in East Asia was sustainable and that these countries
were not bound to a crisis. However, once a crisis started in Thailand, whether because of
its  fundamental weaknesses  or  out  of  self-fulfilling expectations,  investors'  panic
transmitted the  crisis  to  other markets. Uninformed investors  reevaluated the risks
associated with Indonesia, Malaysia, and  Korea when they  saw problems arising in
Thailand, and decided to pull their investments out of these neighboring countries. In a
world of self-fulfilling  investor expectations,  there exist multiple equilibria. An integrated
global economy transmitted investors' pessimistic expectations across borders, causing
contagion and eventual crises.
3Several questions  are  of  interest  to  us:  How  does  contagion  take  place  so
extensively, and why is it so devastating? Is it a direct consequence of unfettered capital
account liberalization and financial globalization or an outcome of domestic economic
imbalances and weaknesses that are common across a cluster of countries? Have the
policy responses to crises and contagion been adequate to minimize their impact on the
real aspect of the economy? What type of international financial architecture is needed to
prevent and to  manage crises and contagion, or to  cope with the risks generated by
volatile capital flows?
The East Asian experience offers a fruitful laboratory to examine these questions.
The paper will therefore investigate factors behind and lessons learned from the crisis in
Thailand and contagion/crises in Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia. Particular attention is
paid to the extent to which the crises in the latter three countries were home grown or
created by contagion and whether these crises and contagion were based on fundamental
problems or were dominated by self-fulfilling  expectations of investors.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we investigate briefly the origins of the
East Asian crisis, emphasizing the fundamental structural vulnerabilities that built up in
the three years prior to the crisis. Second, we examine the different transmission channels
of contagion observed in East Asia, and attempt to untangle the fundamental linkages
from expectations-driven  contagion. Third, we present nine lessons learned from the East
Asian crisis and contagion, and present policy recommendations to minimize the risks
and impact of crises and contagion and to resolve their systemic consequences.
4II. THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS: VULNERABILITIES  AND TRIGGER
1. Globalization  and Domestic Weaknesses
Four  factors made  Thailand, Indonesia, and  Korea  particularly  vulnerable to
external shocks in the pre-crisis period: (a) a burgeoning, global flow of private capital,
especially of short-term nature, in search of higher returns; (b) macroeconomic policies
that allowed large inflows of short-term,  unhedged capital to fuel a domestic credit boom;
(c) newly liberalized but insufficiently regulated domestic financial markets with highly
leveraged corporations; and (d) mounting political uncertainty. In essence, the push from
global capital markets, often without due diligence and beyond prudence, interacted with
poorly regulated domestic financial systems to exacerbate a domestic credit expansion.
This combination led to over investment in domestic non-tradable sectors (manifested  as
property price bubbles especially in Thailand) and in selected inefficient manufacturing
sectors (as was done by Korean chaebol firms). Availability of cheap capital that was
poorly  intermediated through  weakly supervised and  governed financial institutions
allowed corporations to add debt to their already highly leveraged balance sheets. This
vulnerability exposed many East Asian countries to  the shocks of changing investor
behavior.
Patterns of indebtedness varied across countries. In Thailand, finance companies
and  commercial  banks,  availing  themselves  of  low  interest  foreign-currency-
denominated loans, borrowed heavily from abroad to invest in projects with low rates of
return such as construction and real estate. Financial institutions' net foreign liabilities
rose from 6 percent of domestic deposit liabilities in 1990 to 30 percent by 1996 (World
Bank,  1998b). In  Indonesia, corporations were the  primary borrowers from  foreign
5sources, much of it offshore, while they also borrowed from domestic banks. Korean
banks had large foreign borrowing, while Korean corporations borrowed heavily from
domestic sources. On the other hand, countries with relatively low short-term external
debt (in particular measured as a ratio to foreign exchange reserves), such as Malaysia
and the Philippines, were not affected much in the initial phase of the East Asian crisis"
Three  microeconomic factors  accentuated the  three  crisis-affected  countries'
incentives  to borrow abroad. First, explicit or implicit government guarantees of financial
institutions' liabilities motivated excessive risk taking, which was passed on to the rest of
the domestic economy. Second, de facto  fixed exchange rate arrangements provided a
perception  that  foreign-currency-denominated loans  were  not  risky  for  domestic
borrowers  or  foreign  lenders.  Third,  high  domestic  finding  costs  and  market
segmentation added to the incentives to borrow abroad. The domestic cost of funds was
significantly higher than the cost of borrowing offshore. 2 Because this access to foreign
markets was only available to the largest and best credit borrowers, these firms and banks
enjoyed a market advantage of borrowing from abroad. 3
The inflows also fed into a system of corporate finance that heightened risks from
abrupt changes in interest rates or the exchange rate. The corporate sector had grown
rapidly over the previous decades in a context of underdeveloped bond markets and over-
) However, the currency markets of these two countries and Indonesia were immediately affected by Thai
baht devaluation in July 1997.  In addition, Malaysia  eventually experienced a severe economic downturn
and banking sector distress.
2 In Thailand, the average nominal interest rate was 16 percent during 1991-96, of which domestic
financial intermediation cost and the base U.S. risk-free rate each represented 4.5 percent and macro and
currency risk factors constituted 2.6 percent.
3 An additional factor in the case of Thailand was the introduction of the offshore banking facility. The
establishment  of the Bangkok International  Banking Facility induced large inflows of foreign bank loans
because local corporations and finance companies received  regulatory and tax advantages over domestic
bank loans. Also, foreign banks without  domestic banking licenses poured a large amount of liquidity into
Thailand, hoping to obtain licenses for baht businesses. See Kawai and Iwatsubo (1998).
6reliance on bank financing. Despite the fact that productivity in the manufacturing sector
in many East Asian countries had started to decline in the pre-crisis period, the corporate
debt-equity  ratio  began  to  rise  to  high  levels  (see  Claessens  et  al.,  1998).4
Correspondingly, interest  burdens became high  and  would  present an  excruciating
dilemma to macroeconomic  policy makers later when the crisis arose. A high interest rate
policy was attempted to support the exchange rate, but only at the cost of imperiling the
highly leveraged corporate sectors and creating a domestic liquidity crunch.
In retrospect, it is  also clear that the regulations and supervision necessary to
manage integration with global external finance had not kept pace with rapid capital
inflows. Inconsistent reforms and inappropriate sequencing of liberalization added to the
build up of vulnerabilities. In Thailand, for example, finance companies were allowed to
undertake  an  increasing  array  of  activities  in  the  1990s without  a  commensurate
improvement in supervision of finance companies. In Indonesia, the number of banks
expanded suddenly in the late  1980s and early  1990s, but the supervisory authorities
spent too little time screening  the integrity of owners and managers to keep out applicants
with  poor prospects  or  fraudulent ventures. In  addition, Indonesia did  not  monitor
international capital flows, and, as a result, the authorities did not collect information
concerning external borrowing by  private  corporations to  use  that  information for
macroeconomic management. In  Korea,  the system of  licensing  and  supervision of
merchant banks was inadequate. These Korean banks borrowed heavily in the offshore
market and invested in highly risky instruments in  countries such as  Indonesia and
4The  debt-equity  ratio of Korean corporations, for example, was more than 317 percent at the end of 1996,
twice the U.S. ratio and four times the Taiwanese ratio. The top 30 Korean chaebols had even higher
leverage, exceeding 400 percent at end-1996.
7Russia. But the authorities had little capacity to monitor and regulate those activities. In
these East Asian countries, banks were often owned by the same groups of firms to whom
they were lending. Regulations requiring prudential management of currency risks, credit
evaluation, and financial reporting and disclosure were wholly inadequate.
A final factor that the three most severely affected countries shared in common is
often overlooked by  economists: the role of  political  uncertainty. In  Thailand, the
political coalition in mid-1997 was judged weak, and the business community openly
worried about its capacity to manage the economy. The problem was more in evidence in
Korea, where by November 1997 worries over the elections and the prospect of an
opposition victory for the first time in the democratic period fueled concern about the
course of economic policy. But the problem was most obvious and acute in Indonesia,
where everyone was aware of the aging of President Soeharto. This concern reached
crisis proportion when the enfeebled president appeared on television after his stroke in
November, revealing to a nation that the once invulnerable  political lion was seriously ill.
2. The Ticking Time Bomb and Vulnerability  Indicators
The time bomb was set and ticking. Rising global liquidity fed huge amounts of
capital into an institutional setting of poor regulation, limited transparency, and related
party lending often  with  negligible due  diligence from  foreign lenders. Explicit or
implicit government guarantees of bank liabilities and a promise of fixed exchange rates
fed into a domestic credit boom that macroeconomic  policy failed to manage. East Asian
countries had taken risks that left them exposed to shocks in several ways:
*  Widening current account deficits, financed by short-term, unhedged capital inflows,
exposed the economies to sudden reversals in capital flows.
8*  Weaknesses in the under-regulated  financial sector had allowed expansion of lending
into risky investments of low rates of return and inflated values, often with currency
and maturity mismatches. This exposed banks, non-bank financial institutions, and
corporations to exchange rate risks.
*  Corporations, often with insider relationships with banks and with weak incentives to
use capital efficiently, became even more highly leveraged when presented with
additional funding options from abroad. This  exposed them to  both  interest and
exchange rate shocks.
*  Finally, political  uncertainly had  risen  to  unusually high  levels, particularly  in
Indonesia.
Figure 1 illustrates that in June 1997 Korea was, among a select group of emerging
markets, the country with the highest ratios of M25 to foreign reserves and short-term
debt to foreign exchange reserves. Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia were other countries
that  before  the  East  Asian  crisis  ranked  high  according  to  these  indicators  of
vulnerability. 6
5 M2 is a broad definition of the money supply, including cash, demand deposits, time and savings
deposits, and money market balances.
6 It should  be noted that the definition of "reserves" in Figure I understates  the actual exposure  because it
does not account for forward commitments  of the Bank of Thailand of some US$26 billion and the Bank of
Korea of about US$6 billion.
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VulrferabilIty  Indicators  - June 1997
700  -
Indonesia
600  U  *Korea
.
1t 500-  Philippines,
-Y  *  Thailand
,  400  -Me)dco
Malaysia  a  g  *Russia
''  300  Brazil  gentna
7j200
Chile U  U Colombia
100  Peru
0  . I  l  I
0  50  100  150  200  250
Short Term Debt  as % of Foreign  Resrves
It is important to note that a strong counterfactual  case can be made that at several
key junctures different domestic policies might have defused the ticking time bomb. The
Korean government, for example, was able to borrow at 50 basis points over LIBOR
during the first half of 1997, and, had the government known about-and  reacted to-the
mounting short-term debt in the private banks and corporations, they could have taken
policies to reduce the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves. Had Thailand
tightened fiscal policy in  1996, then it might have cooled property markets, deflated
aggregate demand, and brought down the current account imbalance financed largely
through short-tern  borrowings, which,  together with the floating of  the baht, could
arguably have led to a soft landing. Had President Soeharto reacted boldly and decisively
early in the fall of 1997 to demonstrate  new commitments to reform (as Kenward (1999)
argues), then Indonesia might have avoided the meltdown that subsequently  occurred.
We can not, of course, know the answers because these policies were not adopted.
Nonetheless, noting these  counterfactuals underscores  two  points.  First,  no  set  of
10indicators is fully reliable as predictors of crises. Second, a  reason for this  lack of
predictive power  is  that  expectations-and  interdependence of  expectations among
financial agents-play  a large and unpredictable  role in crises.
3. The Trigger: The Thai Baht Crisis
Macroeconomic imbalances and financial sector vulnerabilities were pronounced
in many East Asian economies, particularly in Thailand. The Thai current account deficit,
which was financed by short-term capital inflows, had reached a high of 8 percent of
GDP  in  1996.  The  heavy  inflows  and  credit  boom  had  channeled  funds  into
nonproductive assets such as construction and real estate, creating asset price bubbles.
The private sector had borrowed huge amounts from abroad and, while taking advantage
of the perceived promise of a pegged exchange rate, did not  hedge against foreign
currency risks.
In 1996, export growth began to slow down after growing 20 percent in 1995. Thai
exports contracted by 1 percent in 1996. Although all East Asian exports had slowed with
the slow growth in world demand, Thailand was the worst hit. This was mainly due to
three factors. First, there was a loss of wage competitiveness associated with Thai baht
appreciation on a real, effective basis. Second, the demand for Thai products slumped
badly in world markets, particularly electronics.  Third, foreign markets for Thai products,
notably Japan, were in the doldrums of a recession. At the same time, prices of real
property had begun to decline. Vacancy rates increased in 1996 as the supply of office
space began to  overshoot demand. Several finance companies and a  few commercial
banks experienced serious difficulties in  early  1997, and the  central bank  chose to
11provide liquidity support. But this only added to fumds  in the market ready to attack the
currency peg.
Equity investors were the first to withdraw. The stock market peaked for the year in
February and fell by more than 30 percent by year-end. Perceptions began to take hold in
the market that the exchange rate was misaligned despite rising interest rates. Private
capital flows started to taper off in early 1997, with bond issues and syndicated loans
falling in the first half of 1997 by 30 percent relative to the same period in the previous
year. Confidence took a  further hit when Somprasong Land defaulted on a  eurobond
issue.
The Thai government intervened heavily to support the peg when the baht came
under serious attack for the first time in February 1997. The central bank eventually
issued some US$23 billion in forward foreign exchange contracts at a time when foreign
exchange reserves were hovering about US$25 billion. As investor perceptions remained
jittery, the finance companies came under pressure, and the government continued to
pump a large volume of liquidity to support those companies. This led to further capital
outflows and a decline in foreign exchange reserves. In mid-May, Thailand announced
capital controls after facing selling pressure and massive intervention in the forward
markets. 7 Finally, on July 2,  1997, the government yielded to the market forces and
abandoned the peg, thus allowing baht devaluation.
7The  Thai authorities tried to keep foreign  investors from acquiring  the baht, thereby causing a shortage of
the baht and propping up the value of the baht offshore. The capital controls essentially segmented  the
onshore and offshore foreign exchange markets and introduced different baht rates to the two markets for
about two months. The swap premium in onshore  and offshore markets began to converge after end-August
1997,  suggesting  the diminishing  effectiveness of controls (see Ariyoshi et. al., 2000). The controls were
lifted in January 1998.
12III. CHANNELS OF CONTAGION
1. Contagion Syndromes
The Thai baht devaluation triggered withdrawal of capital from the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region and several other East Asian countries as a
financial panic progressively ensued. Developments in Thailand caused investors to look
more critically at vulnerabilities elsewhere in the region that they had previously ignored.
In  the process,  investors discovered new information that  amplified their  concerns,
especially about the  health of the financial system and the  magnitude of short-term
external debt in the region. Market doubts were compounded  by the lack of transparency
about the financial and corporate sectors and, hence, about the magnitude of contingent
liabilities. Once investors lost confidence that foreign exchange reserves would cover
short-term external debt, both foreign and domestic investors scrambled to  get out. 8
Markets became much less forgiving. The lack of a mechanism for orderly workouts of
private external debt undoubtedly contributed to the full-scale financial panic that swept
Thailand, Indonesia,  Korea and to a lesser extent Malaysia.
A quick review of its chronology illustrates the dynamics of the crisis, along with
its spillover effects. 9 After Thailand devalued the baht, the Philippines allowed the peso
to freely float on July II  and Malaysia abandoned the defense of the ringgit peg on July
8  With the possible exception of Thailand, foreign investors apparently did not play a large role in
triggering the crises. Data on mutual fund and pension fund holdings of equities and other assets in Asian
countries do not suggest a massive outflow of foreign capital during the July-December 1997  period
(Kaminsky et al., forthcoming). Foreign investors appear to have reduced their holdings prior to the crisis,
particularly in Thailand, and increased their holdings afterward, particularly in the first few months of
1998.  According to Eichengreen and Mathieson (1998), hedge funds and other short-term investors  played
a limited role in triggering the crisis. The massive reversal in capital flows arose mainly from the reluctance
of foreign lenders to roll over short-term  claims after September 1997 (causing an outflow of about US$50
billion for the affected countries); the purchases of foreign exchange  by local corporate institutions to cover
unhedged, open positions; and capital flight owing to political uncertainty in Indonesia.
1314.10  When an IMF package  was signed  with Thailand  on August  14, Indonesia  allowed
the  rupiah  to  float.  Under  exchange  market  pressure,  Taiwan  floated  the  new  Taiwan
dollar  on October  17. When the Hong Kong dollar  was tested  in late  October,  the Hong
Kong Monetary  Authority  allowed  the interest  rate to rise  to defend  its currency  board,
leading to a sharp  fall in the  Hang  Seng index.  This produced  a shockwave  felt  around
global financial  markets,  causing  stock price  declines  in both Europe  and  Wall Street on
October  27 and reverberating  back  again to East  Asian markets.  At that  point, the crisis
was also transmitted  to Latin America. 1
An  IMF rescue  package  for  Indonesia  was signed  on  November  4,  but could  not
stop the depreciation  of the rupiah. Korea  was forced to widen  the exchange  rate band in
mid-November,  and  both  the  stock  price  and  the  won  fell  sharply.  Korea  officially
abandoned  the exchange  rate band following the signing  of the IMF financial  package  on
December  4  and  moved  to  a  floating  system  in  mid-December.  The  Korean  crisis
situation  was contained  by mid-January  1998 when  an agreement  was reached  between
Korea  and  international  creditor  banks  to restructure  Korean  banks'  short-term  external
9For  descriptions of the East Asian crisis see, for example, IMF (1997, 1998a, 1998b),  ADB (1998), ADB
and World  Bank (1998), World Bank (1998a, 1998b),  and Montes (1998).
10  In response  to the increasing volatility,  the Malaysian  authorities, in August 1997, introduced  restrictions
on banks' non-commercial-related offer-side swap transactions  with non-residents. As a result, wide
spreads emerged between onshore and offshore interest rates. However, capital outflows continued through
various legal channels to take advantage of the high offshore interest rates (see Ariyoshi et. al., 2000). After
substantial  capital outflows had taken place and foreign exchange  reserves had stabilized at a lower level,
Malaysia introduced  in September 1998 a number of selective controls on capital outflows, requiring
foreign investors in the stock market to keep ringgit funds in Malaysia for 12 months, limiting offshore
trading of ringgit, and imposing a series of restrictions on residents. In February 1999,  the authorities
replaced the 12-month  holding  period rule for repatriation  of portfolio capital with a graduated exit levy on
repatriation of the principal of capital investments  made before February 15, 1999, and with a graduated
exit levy on repatriation of the profits (including capital gains) from investments made after February 15,
1999.  In September 1999,  the authorities abolished  the levy on principal repatriation. Remaining controls
include prohibition of ringgit internationalization,  exit levy on profit repatriation, and restrictions on
residents.
Perry and Lederman (1998) provide a good description of how the Asian crisis affected Latin America.
14debt. Between February and  May  1998, the  most  significant events  took place  in
Indonesia,  with riots and looting and the resignation of President Soeharto.
These events show how the crisis spread from one country to another and how the
crisis  and  contagion  swamped  the  entire  East  Asian  region.  Contagion produced
simultaneous falls in exchange rates and stock prices (see Figures 2 and 3) reflecting
massive capital outflows. Capital outflows from the region erased the inflows of the first
semester within the space of the last six months of 1997 and turned the net flow negative
by US$20 billion for the East Asia-5-affected countries. Between 1996 and  1997, net
capital flows had reversed by more than US$100 billion for the ASEAN-4 (US$71
billion) and Korea (US$33 billion).
The drop in stock prices (in local currency and dollar terms) since July 1997 was
much more pronounced than in any previous downturn in East Asia, and even exceeded
downturns in most Latin American countries following the Tequila crisis. Exchange rate
co-movement was pronounced among the ASEAN-4 countries during the period after
August  1997, except for  the Indonesian rupiah, which was after November. Private
capital inflows came virtually to a halt for the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea in the last
quarter of 1997 and first half of 1998.
Indeed, if the crisis had stopped at this point and been confined to East Asia, then
the  view  that  the  domestic  macroeconomic disequlibria combined  with  domestic
structural weaknesses was the primary cause of the crisis might have dominated the
Radelet-Sachs (Radelet and Sachs, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) view that investor panic was the
primary cause. But the fact is that the crisis was beginning to drive the global financial
markets into turmoil.
15The global financial market turmoil intensified when Russia decided to devalue the
ruble and to impose a forced rescheduling of domestic government debt on August 17,
1998. The Russian crisis was felt in  developed and emerging markets. A number of
highly leveraged investors, including hedge ftnds,  with assets in Russia suffered large
losses.  In  particular,  financial markets  around  the  world  were  hit  hard  after  the
deteriorated financial condition of Long-Term Capital Management became public news.
The private rescue, organized by  the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York, and the
reduction of the U.S. interest rates helped to avoid a systemic global crisis.
The  events  in  Russia  generated strong  spillover effects  on  emerging market
economies. In East Asia, Malaysia imposed capital controls on September 1, 1998, to
isolate the market from the global financial turmoil and to prevent speculation against the
Malaysian ringgit. Other markets in East Asia did not suffer particular stress following
Russia's devaluation and unilateral debt rescheduling. On the other hand, Latin American
financial markets faced severe stress in  September and  October. The most affected
country was Brazil, which was forced to devalue its currency, the real, in January 1999.
Other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
and Venezuela, also suffered directly or indirectly the effects of the Russian crisis.
Irrespective of the channels of contagion, it is clear that East Asia at least has
become much more financially interdependent as a region. Even though exchange rate
policy became much more flexible after the crisis, cross-country correlation among
movements of exchange rates became significant and large (Table 1). With the exception
of Hong Kong (because of its dollar peg), the average monthly movements of currency
values were closely correlated within the region, typically ranging from 0.5  to  0.8.
16However, with a few exceptions, exchange rate movements were not strongly correlated
across regions. This is in sharp contrast with stock market prices, which were strongly
correlated within each region (East Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe
including Russia) as well as across regions. In this sense, contagion of stock market
prices is more global than that of exchange rates.
2. Channels of Contagion
The word "contagion" in this paper is used in a broad sense to denote the spillover
effects across countries. 12 Contagion has been widely used to characterize the reaction of
financial variables-such  as exchange rates, interest rates, and stock market prices-to
events in foreign countries. Movements of one country's  exchange rates, stock prices,
and  interest  rates  correlated with  another  country's  movements  are  interpreted as
contagion. Contagion therefore involves cross-country co-movements of the financial
variables and high correlations  of these variables across countries.
As described in Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), there are different possible
channels of  contagion.  These  channels  include both  fundamental linkages  among
economies and factors unrelated to  fundamentals. Fundamental linkages include both
"real" and "financial" linkages. We use the framework described in Dombusch et al. to
analyze the channels of contagion during the East Asian crisis.
Fundamental linkages-real.  Real linkages have generally been associated with
trade and/or foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI linkages are real in East Asia because
FDI flows tend to complement and strengthen the trade linkages between the source and
recipient countries. 13
12 For a more complete guide to contagion, see www.worldbank.org/contagion.
13 See papers on trade-FDI linkages that are included in Lee and Roland-Holst  (1998).
17Intra-regional exports among the East Asian economies accounted for almost 40
percent of total exports in 1996,  up from 32 percent in 1990. If Japan is included, then the
figure rises to 51 percent. These high levels of intra-regional trade reflect a process of
specialization and  outsourcing of  activities  from  the  higher  to  the  lower  income
economies in  the region. About three-quarters of  the intra-regional trade is  in  raw
materials, intermediate inputs, and capital equipment. Such intra-regional trade accounts
for  over  50  percent  of  total  East  Asian  imports  of  these  products.  This  trade
complementarity  probably contributed  to the high speed and directness of contagion. The
drop in demand for imports in  one East Asian country would reduce income of the
potential exporting countries, triggering declines in these countries' demand for imports
from the original and other countries. These mechanisms were probably more significant,
causing contagious currency depreciations, than  the changing price  competitiveness
would indicate.
Fundamental linkages-financial.  A financial linkage is created when international
investors engage in global diversification of financial portfolios and connect different
economies financially. Countries with internationally traded financial assets and with
liquid markets tend to be subject to contagion. For examples of this linkage see Kodres
and Pritsker (1998) and Calvo (1998).
18Table 1. Cross-Country Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Exchange rates and Stock Prices, July 1997-September 1999
Exchange  Rate  Correlation  Coefficient  Matnx
Korea  Taiean  Hoag  Singapore Malaysia  Thaiatnd  Indonesia Phih,pines  China  Mexico  Brazil  Argentina  Chdle  Peru  Colombia Venezla[  Russia  Poland  Hungary  Romania  S- Afhica  India  Pakistan
Korw  I AO~~~on
Taiwan  -.. W39.  ;."  1.00
Hong  Kong  0.35  40.22  1.00
Mexico  003  0.19  -0.28  -. 10  -. 35  -0.15  -0.07  0.02  -0.12  1.00
Brazil  -. 02  0.01  0.08  0.10  -. 05  0.01  0.04  -. 04  0.01  0.13  1.00
Argentina  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00
PChile  s  031  ,  ,  032  0.31  0.26  0.2  -0.1  0.07  042  0  00  1.00
China  -0.02  -0.135  -0.21  0017  -0.26  -0.32  -0.07  -0.43  0.06  R.  .0  .0  10
Colmbia  0.11  -0.1  -0.13  -0.14  4-.06  0.14  -0.06  0.27  -0.47  0.33  0.07  0.00  -0.04  0.01  1.00
Venezuela  -0.08  0.15  0.10  0.12  -0.20  -0.07  0.03  0.13  0.22  0.20  -0.02  0.00  0.16  0.12  0.06  1.00
RuAsia  0.02  0.15  0.08  0.18  0.41  -0.5  0.19  0.00  0.00  02.0e  0.02  0.00  -0.13  - 3,,  Ui,.>;  0.16  1.00
Poblnd  0.10  010  0.12  0.31  0.01  0.32  0.11  0.21  0.06  0.04  0.20  0.00  0.20  0.26  0.15  0.13  0.09  100
Hungary  0.23  0.35  0.14  4  0719  0.35  0.29  0.21  0.21  -027  -0.01  0.00  0.24  -. 07  -0.40  0.20  -0.24,  .,3-,  1.00
Romania  -0.01  0.05  -0.66  0.17  00.0  0.01  -0.02  0.15  0.29  0.33  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.12  -. 30  0.20  0.11  0.26  0.29  100
S.VArica  40.11  0.54  -007  037  0.27  012  0.26  0.21  0.14  -. 03  0.06  0.00  0.26  0.00  -0.40  02i  4.23  0.27  0.22  0.04  1.00
India  0  0  02  0.0i  03  '  0.20  0.12  0.04  0.12  0.00  0.28  -0.00  40.13  .03  -0.21  0.02  0.19  -0.23  0.24  1.00
Pakistan  -0.03  0.16  -0.19  O.5  0.10  -004  -. 04  0.00  -0.30  0.01  -0.10  0.00  2-0.012-0.10  0.08  0.13  -0.13  -0.15  0.21  -0.10  0.20  -0.03  1.00
- Korea  Taiwan  Honig  Singa,oore Malaysia  Thailand  Indonesia Phdippmoes Chata  Menico  Brazil  Chile  Argentina  Peru  Colombiat Venezueba  Ruasia  Pohand  Hungary  Romanit  S.Africa  India  Pakaistan|
India  0.24  . 0.260  0.6  0.2  0.  03  0.0.7  0.29  00. iPakistan  -0.23  0.226  - 79  . 0330  0.29  -0.05  0.12  -0.22  0231  tt1  0.17  -0.15  0.12  0.2  0.2  0.28  -0.16  .0.03  0.17  0.10  -0.03  1.00
Notes:  The conrelation  coefficients  are caklcaateid by asing  the log first difference  in the  monthly  nommnal exchange  rntes  and  stock  market  prices in local  cornency  (pienod average).
The carrelation  coenficioets  that ore statirtically  xigafrcant at the 5% level ore highlighted.
Source IMF,  Intemationat  Financial  Statiatics  (exchange  ratas) and Datastr am (stock prices).
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2  0Financial linkages in a region are often more substantive  through bank loans, which
also suggests  that events in one country can affect other countries. Japanese banks had an
extensive exposure to  East Asia when the latter was hit by a currency crisis in  1997,
much in the way that U.S. banks did to Latin America just before the outbreak of the debt
crisis of the early  1980s. Japanese banks were forced to reassess the quality of their
portfolios invested in East Asia when the Thai baht crisis erupted, calling loans and
cutting off credit lines in the region, thus propagating to the neighboring economies.
European commercial banks operating internationally in the region were also forced to
rebalance the overall risk of their portfolios and reverse bank credits, thereby transmitting
crisis. Some Korean banks that borrowed foreign currency and invested it in Indonesian
instruments were badly affected by rupiah depreciation and were driven into serious
financial distress. In a broader sense, the Thai crisis may have led global investors and
bank creditors to revise their model of East Asian development and to  reduce their
exposure in the regions, thus negatively affecting  the foreign exchange and stock markets
in the neighboring countries.
Factors  unrelated  to fundamentals-herding.  The magnitudes  of recent  swings  in
exchange rates and stock prices across countries seem to be beyond those predicted by
any  fundamental  linkages.  Shocks  were  indeed  transmitted  to  economies  where
fundamental linkages are not present or  strong. Domestic and  international financial
markets transmit shocks across countries when the markets become concerned about the
future prospects of countries or when markets see a crisis somewhere else. Investors may
have inferred that  when Hong Kong was under attack in  October  1997, Argentina,
another country with a currency board, would also be under attack. These events affect
21expectations. So investors panic and run away from countries that do not necessarily
share fundamental linkages. Such investor behavior is called "herding."
3. Contagion: What Can We Conclude?
What seem to have been the dominant channels of contagion that transmitted the
Thai virus to other countries? First, it seems hard to argue that trade and FDI were a
dominant channel of contagion, if at all. While trade and FDI linkages were relatively
strong among the East Asian countries, Korea had relatively weak trade or FDI linkages
with Thailand. Second, demand and supply effects through the real sectors take longer to
transmit than the time actually observed. Third, speculators mounted attacks on countries
with minimal trade or FDI relationships. On October 23, 1997, at the height of the attacks
on Hong Kong, speculators attacked Argentina, whose main relation to East Asia was its
similarity of exchange rate regime (i.e., the currency board) rather than trade or FDI
linkages. The strong trade linkages among the East Asian countries (much like Brazil and
Argentina in early 1999) and large FDI flows were important,  but only as filtered through
the  expectations of  financial investors.  To  be  sure,  real  linkages were  important,
simultaneously contracting aggregate demand in the region, but only after the currency
crisis induced a recession in each country.
What then about financial contagion? There seems to be more evidence that the
crisis was transmitted through financial linkages. For example, a shock in one country
induced international commercial banks to reduce exposure in other countries to protect
the quality of their portfolios, thus propagating shocks and crises across countries. That
some Japanese, European, and Korean banks, badly hit by the rupiah depreciation, were
driven into distress or at minimum saw rapid deterioration in  their portfolio quality,
22thereby reducing their bank exposure to the region, argues that they were channels of
contagion (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000).
Probably of greater consequence, however, was the contagion driven by investor
sentiments and perceptions. This appears to have two distinct elements: First, a common
reaction to perceived problems and, second, a common fear-irrespective  of individual
agent judgments about the perceived problems-of  what the herd of investors might do. 
14
In Korea, investors simultaneously  came to note the risk of large short-term external debt,
relative to foreign exchange reserves, and began to  sell the won, and any individual
investor could ignore the stampede only at his peril. In Indonesia, the collapse was also
driven by investor panic. In this case, domestic investors were scared by the haphazard
closure of the domestic banks and some news associated with President Soeharto's ill
health. The politics of regime change added to the uncertainty in Korea, Indonesia, and
Thailand and unquestionably fed investor panic.
IV. NINE LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS AND CONTAGION
Dornbusch, Park, and  Claessens (2000) review five categories of  evidence on
contagion: correlation of  asset prices; conditional probabilities of  a  currency crisis;
changes in volatility; comovements of capital flows and rates of return; and other tests.
Their conclusion is that "fundamentals help predict spillovers and that trade links are
important factors as well", though "common creditor and other links through financial
centers transmit volatility from one country to  another..." (2000:190).  Their review
confirms their  conclusion that  "comovements are unavoidable and that  fundamental
23factors are important" in  determining the susceptibility of  an economy to  contagion.
They conclude with preliminary suggestions for policy, focusing on the importance of
disclosure,  improved  standards,  and  prudential  controls  as  well  as  changes  in
international financial architecture.
In this section, we draw lessons from East Asia's experience with contagion.  As
Dornbusch, et al (2000) conclude, it is difficult to distinguish conceptually (much less
empirically) whether investors are reacting to the fundamentals  of an economy at risk or
to their predictions of the herd behavior of the group of investors. This implies that policy
makers have to ensure that both their fundamentals  are sound and, more difficult, they are
widely perceived to be sound among domestic and foreign investors. Because crises can
originate either internally in the  domestic economy or  externally through contagion,
policymakers must aim at crisis/contagion prevention on both fronts.  Minimizing the
negative impact of a  crisis or contagion, once it occurs,  should be  the next policy
concern. When the crisis develops into systemic proportions, resolving its economic and
social consequences should be the final policy objective.
We present nine lessons about crisis and contagion that apply regardless of its
origin-that  is, regardless of whether it is internally or externally generated.  These are
grouped in four not  mutually exclusive categories of policies: preventing crises  and
contagion, managing crises and contagion, resolving the systemic consequences of crises,
and strengthening regional arrangements  to complement the global financial architecture
to help in prevention, management, and resolution.
14 As part of the growing  empirical  evidence,  Kaminsky  and Schmukler  (1999) find that 33 percent  of the
sharpest  changes  in stock market prices  during the Asian crisis were unrelated  to any relevant news about
241. Prevention of Crisis and Contagion
In a  world of free capital mobility, attacks on  currencies can occur whenever
confidence is lost. A currency crisis in a foreign country can rapidly trigger a crisis at
home. Crisis prevention measures attempt to lower the probability of having a crisis and
contagion and to reduce ex-ante the risk factors.
In retrospect, three elements combined to build up East Asian vulnerability:  the rise
in  external private  indebtedness, mainly short-term and  unhedged; the  asset-liability
mismatch in the financial system together with its low return intermediation; and the
highly leveraged financial position of corporations. Each provides a lesson for the future.
Lesson 1: Avoid large current account deficits financed  through short-term private
capital inflows.
Several policy domains affect the external net liability position of a country and its
propensity toward crisis. In East Asia, it is instructive to  review several interrelated
policies: information disclosure, foreign exchange reserves, fiscal and monetary policy,
exchange rate policy, and policy toward the capital account.
Information disclosure. Much of the over-lending prior to the East Asian crisis
might not have occurred had international lenders correctly appraised the actual balance
sheets of borrowing corporations and portfolio of financial institutions. Many investors
tried to undertake due diligence, but could not receive accurate information. Because
information was costly to  gather, many investors did not  spend resources to  obtain
valuable, but costly, information, relied on superficial reviews by  others, and  simply
followed the  herd.  Better  information disclosure  can  help  mitigate  this  problem,
particularly among relatively uninformed international  investors.
economic fundamentals.
25Some macro information was available before the crisis, such as the stock of loans
in each East Asian country by BIS (Bank for International Settlements)-reported banks,
which indicated that  some countries had  large bank  exposure that  exceeded foreign
exchange reserves. However, investors ignored such information in  their investment
decisions. Better information can guide international investors to efficient and productive
investment, if sufficient incentives are created for the investors to use such information.
The international financial system also needs to increase its transparency on the
lenders' side and coordinate its regulatory frameworks to limit the tendencies towards
boom-bust behavior and to create a more level playing field.  Specifically, information
disclosure by  large international investors, including highly leveraged institutions, is
necessary  to  prevent  them  from  imprudent  decision  making.  An  internationally
coordinated approach is  imperative to  better regulate hedge  funds and  other highly
leveraged institutions.
Foreign  exchange  reserve  policy.  As  capital  movements  have  become  larger,
foreign exchange reserves have become an increasingly important line of defense. The
adequacy of foreign exchange reserves can no longer be measured by their coverage of
imports but by the magnitude of potential capital outflows. Guidotti (1999) concludes
that reserves should equal the amount of capital contractually  due in the coming year. But
reserves should arguably be larger if current account deficits are large (e.g., more than 2
percent of GDP), if the exchange rate is fixed and hence more vulnerable to shocks, or if
the economy has  historical tendency toward instability, e.g.,  because of  commodity
dependence and chronic terms of trade shocks (see World Bank, 2000b). The optimal
amount of reserves must also be judged against the opportunity cost of carrying them.
26Fiscal and monetary  policy. In the case of the affected East Asian economies, fiscal
policy was disciplined and monetary policy was non-inflationary  until the mid-1990s. But
in  Thailand, fiscal policy became pro-cyclical in  an  attempt to  stave off  a  growth
slowdown in the quarters immediately  preceding the crisis. The country continued to face
mounting current account deficits in  1996, investor perceptions began to shift against
local assets, and capital inflows began to attenuate. Authorities tried to extend the growth
cycle, but  fiscal stimulus, instead of increasing output, was transmitted mainly to the
balance of payments through rising imports and more outflows in the capital account,
worsening the external balance and pressuring the peg (World Bank, 2000a, Chapter 3).
With benefit of hindsight, we can now conclude that to reduce vulnerabilities and the
probability of crisis, macroeconomic policy in 1996 should have reigned in aggregated
demand, avoided excessive credit expansion in the domestic economy, and curtailed the
excessive external reliance on foreign savings. This would have slowed the expansion,
but reduced the extent of real effective overvaluation, reduced the current account deficit,
and slowed the build up of short-term external debt relative to foreign exchange reserves.
Monetary policy, as  soon as  capital inflows began to  taper  off,  should have
maintained consistency with  the de facto  pegged exchange rate  arrangement, which
would  have implied reduced credit  growth, rising interest rates,  and  slower output
growth. This adjustment to aggregate demand might have preempted the currency run
that eventually  came.
Exchange rate policy. Countries with large current account deficits are dependent
on capital inflows to maintain their external balance. If investors lose confidence in a
currency value, however, capital inflows can stop abruptly and capital outflows can take
27place in massive amounts. In the face of sudden shocks to capital flows and currency
markets, the country may be forced to adopt a contractionary monetary policy and to
curtail the economic activity sustained by capital inflows. It is therefore important to
maintain a viable exchange rate regime, with a consistent monetary and fiscal policy
framework in order to deter speculative attacks and thus avoid "sudden stops."I 5
In the case of East Asia, several economies had maintained stable exchange rates
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar until the crisis. For example, Thailand had its baht pegged to a
basket of currencies, with the U.S. dollar having a dominant weight. Other countries also
had their currencies de facto pegged to  the dollar. This was widely perceived as an
official guarantee  to minimize currency risk and to encourage capital inflows. U.S. dollar
appreciation since  1995, against  currencies of  other major  industrialized countries,
particularly  against  the  Japanese  yen,  may  have  contributed  to  a  perception  of
unsustainable  exchange  rates  in  East  Asia.  But  even  more  important  was  the
unwillingness of authorities to take early corrective action to adjust external imbalances
when investor perceptions began to shift against local assets and capital inflows began to
attenuate.
Capital account liberalization.  The East Asian crisis has shown that capital account
liberalization that provides financial institutions with access to cheap foreign savings can
set  the stage for  asset-liability mismatches. Unfettered capital  mobility may not  be
desirable if  the macroeconomic and  supervisory policy  framework is  weak  and  if
domestic financial and corporate sectors cannot manage risks prudently nor intermediate
to highest return investments.
5 See Calvo (1998)  and Kawai  (1998b).
28Some countries have adopted capital controls as ways to  isolate the domestic
economy from the volatility of global financial cycles (see Kawai, 1998b; World Bank
2000b,  Chapter 5).  16  Restrictions on  capital inflows usually have  the  objective of
curtailing excessive short-term inflows through taxation of foreign loans with a  short
maturity (usually less than  12 months), higher reserve or liquidity requirements (see
Dooley,  1996), or  imposition of  outright controls. Chile had  unremunerated reserve
requirements (URR) in place from 1991 until September 1998, starting with a 20 percent
URR in a  non-interest bearing account with the central bank  on all newly  entering
portfolio capital for a maturity of up to one year. This rate was raised in May 1992 to 30
percent for foreign currency borrowing except by corporations and for all transactions in
August 1992, and then lowered to 10 percent in June 1998 before being zeroed out in
September 1998.17  The effectiveness  of the controls seemed to progressively diminish as
investors learned of ways to circumvent the legislation, requiring successive efforts at
expanding the comprehensiveness of the control regime. Several authors (Gallego et al.,
1999; Edwards, 1999) found that the URR measures were effective in lengthening the
contracted maturity of capital inflows, and the average maturity of newly contracted debt
rose, though this had little impact on the volume of repayment associated with the stock
of debt.
A similar type of control can be exercised through prudential regulation of banks
(see  Stiglitz  and  Bhattacharya,  1999).  Calvo  and  Mendoza  (1999)  studied  the
effectiveness of prudential controls on capital inflows in limiting foreign borrowing by
banks. Prudential regulation is less distortionary and less subject to  evasion, but  less
16 Here we focus on controls to regulate capital inflows,  while we consider controls on capital outflows
under "Managing Crises and Contagion," Lesson 5.
29comprehensive. As  such,  prudential  regulation  does  not  prevent  direct  corporate
borrowing of the type prevalent in Indonesia,  but it does wall off the financial sector from
the largest contingent risk to the treasury. Both types of  controls on inflows require
complex and sophisticated administration, careful monitoring, and raise interest costs to
domestic borrowers.
Lesson 2: Aggressively regulate and supervise financial systems to ensure that banks
and corporations manage risks prudently.
In  East Asia, in  the run up to  the crisis, banks developed huge  asset-liability
mismatches-unhedged  foreign exchange borrowings invested in non-tradable sectors
and  short-term loans  lent long into property-all  of  which left banks  vulnerable to
exchange depreciations and to interest rate surges. This reflected the fact that domestic
financial systems were not well-regulated or governed when capital account liberalization
was accelerated in the first half of the 1990s. Regulatory and supervisory frameworks
over  financial  institutions  were  weak.  Domestic  financial  institutions  were  not
sufficiently governed for prudent risk-management, nor were they sufficiently  capitalized
with appropriate loan classification and adequate loan loss provisions. Moral hazard was
created because of the explicit or implicit government guarantees to individual financial
institutions.
Having  a  resilient  and  robust  financial  sector is  key  to  avoiding  crises  and
contagion. First, as a preventive measure, countries with resilient and robust financial
sectors will probably suffer less from contagion. Second, these countries will have more
flexibility to cope with external shocks and to take corrective measures during a crisis
and contagion. Countries with a solvent banking sector and low corporate leverage ratios
17  See Ariyoshi et. al. (2000).
30will be able to raise interest rates to contain speculative attacks on the exchange rate.
Countries with  large  foreign exchange reserves  and  access to  contingent liquidity
facilities will be able to inject liquidity in the system, avoiding credit squeeze and bank
runs.
Policies that can achieve this financial structure include:
*  Prudential regulation of asset-liability  matches and portfolio and loan standards that
apply internationally accepted  norms;
*  Capital adequacy regulations of at least those required under Basle standards, and
even higher;
*  Clear governance rules to  prevent insider and group lending not  subject to  loan
evaluation and creditworthiness and standards;
- Transparency for investors and depositors through mandatory public disclosure of
audited financial statements; and
- Deposit  insurance  limited  to  a  minimal  share  of  private  liabilities to  bound
government contingent liabilities in event of crisis, and share risk with investors and
depositors.
Lesson 3: Put  in place  incentives for  sound corporate finance  so as to avoid high
leverage ratios and excessive reliance on foreign borrowing.
The experience in East Asia shows that highly leveraged and vulnerable corporate
sectors were a key determinant of the depth of the crisis. Currency devaluation suddenly
inflated the size of external debt (measured in terms of the domestic currency) and debt
service obligations, and high interest rates also sharply increased domestic debt service
obligations of the  corporations, thereby both  driving the domestic corporations into
31financial  distress.  These  vulnerabilities affected the  banks  with  exposures to  the
corporations. This created a liquidity crunch and deepened the recessionary pressures,
which in turn hurt the corporate sector even more. The presence of a corporate sector
with sustainable debt-to-equity ratios is thus important to weather exchange rate and
interest rate shocks. Several building blocks are essential to an incentive framework for
sound  corporate  finance:  clear  rules  of  corporate  governance,  adequate  financial
disclosure, and corporate capital markets.
Corporate governance. New rules of corporate governance focused on reducing
conglomerate structures; that  is,  concentrated holdings  in  a  few  families, corporate
groups (a  la chaebols), and amalgamated banks, creating a  complex web of  insider
financial flows with minimal due diligence in lending and inadequate corporate oversight.
Rules that require good accounting, auditing and information  disclosure, protect minority
shareholders and  strengthen creditor rights  can  prevent the  build  up  of  huge  debt
positions on narrow capital positions. In addition, external disciplines on enterprises can
be  strengthened by  improving competition policies  both  in  capital markets  and  in
product/services  markets and by creating and enforcing bankruptcy legislation.
Corporate equity  and  bond  markets.  One  of  the  gaps  in  the  financing  and
governance regime in East Asia was the stunted development of corporate equity and
bond markets. Equity markets are an important source of capital, but the reluctance of
family owners and insiders to dilute their ownership share often fed their decision to seek
easy bank financing, often from banks they controlled. At the same time, the absence of
adequate  disclosure and  other protections  for  minority  shareholders has  led many
investors to  eschew  investment in  their domestic markets.  Similarly, bond  markets
32provide constant and instant market evaluation of debt value and, hence, provide an
essential signaling function to financial agents. In the absence of bond markets, banks
had no reason to market their loans to corporations, and corporations had one less reason
to alter their performance to become more efficient. Corporations could thus develop
unsustainable  high debt-equity ratios.
Several policies  are necessary to  develop corporate equity  and  bond markets:
regulatory capacity to implement full disclosure and contract enforcement, protection of
minority shareholder rights and bondholder rights, and neutral tax policies to eliminate
any bias in favor of one form of finance over another.
2. Managing Crises and Contagion
Once a country is affected by a crisis or contagion, the policy objective must focus
on preventing the crisis/contagion from developing into a more serious economic and
social crisis with systemic proportions. Policy options, however, are highly constrained
by its initial conditions, including the initial level of public sector debt, fiscal policy
headroom, the composition of  domestic- and  foreign-currency debt held by  private
financial institutions  and  corporations, relationships between  domestic  debtors  and
domestic and foreign creditors, and the government's relations with domestic and foreign
creditors. In general, policies that restore the country's credibility should be pursued.
Lesson 4: Mobilize timely external liquidity of  sufficient magnitude and in a
context of sound policies to restore market confidence.
If  there  is  a  crisis  or  contagion, whether  it  is  due  to  fundamental or  non-
fundamental linkages, then governments have no choice but to swiftly seek liquidity to
staunch the run on its domestic assets. That liquidity usually comes from the international
33financial institutions (IFI)-such  as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and  the  Asian  Development Bank.  Given the  magnitude of  capital  flows  and  the
clustering of crises, isolated actions of individual governments or institutions are not
sufficient to gain the required confidence. Governrments  of crisis-affected countries could
be faulted for not recognizing the seriousness of the crisis or not moving rapidly to bring
in the IMF.
The strong spillover effects within a region and across regions call for a regional as
well as global  response. A  coordinated action among govermnents and  the IFIs  is
necessary to overcome crises and contagion, at both regional and global levels. 18 These
international interventions, however, have received criticisms from two different camps.
One camp of critics who argue that the IMF should play an international lender of last
resort function insists that the amount of international liquidity provided so far has been
too small and often too late to contain a crisis or contagion. According to this view, to
prevent a  liquidity crisis or  contagion from evolving into a  serious solvency crisis,
international  liquidity must be provided quickly and abundantly. Another camp of critics
who  argue that  IFI interventions create moral hazard problems argue that  the IFIs'
packages may create perverse incentives that heighten risk of crisis: for governments to
run excessively risky policies and for international  investors to underestimate the true risk
of investing in emerging markets (see Krugman, 1998a). To minimize potential moral
hazard, IFI intervention should be contingent upon considerable private participation so
'8 During the 1994-95 crisis in Latin America, the agreements  of Argentina and Mexico with the
intemational financial community  were well received by the markets. These agreements  were signed
simultaneously  by Argentina and Mexico. At that time, all Latin American countries recovered.  The
agreement that Argentina signed with the IMF was the most significant  policy action taken during
Argentina's crisis management.  The agreement  positively impacted  Argentina's market, even after
controlling for the regional market performance. See Ganapolsky and Schmukler (I 998).
34that private international investors share in the costs as penalty for excessive risk taking
(a point elaborated below).
Though intellectual support to transforming the IMF into a limited lender of last
resort is strong, provided the potential for moral hazard is to  be minimized, the G-7
countries have found it  impractical and unrealistic due to  the need to  dramatically
increase the  amount  of  resources available  in  times  of  crisis  and  contagion. The
international community instead  has  taken  an  incrementalist approach  to  liquidity
enhancement through the  creation of  the  Structural Reform Facility (SRF) and  the
Contingent Credit Lines (CCL). Given that no country has decided to use the IMF CCL,
however, requirements for its use need to be relaxed and its attractiveness increased.
Lesson 5: Bailing-in private foreign  creditors at times of crisis is essential; in those
cases when  official resources are limited relative to the magnitude of the crisis and
private  creditors  are  not  amenable  to  coordination,  some  involuntary  private
involvement may be necessary.
When IFI liquidity support is provided in response to a crisis or contagion, it is
essential to  involve private foreign creditors by  encouraging them to  agree on  debt
restructuring through, for example, suspension of payments on external debt during the
"stand-still" period, allowing rollover, extension of maturities, and possibly interest or
debt reductions. In the case of commercial bank loans, coordination between a limited
number of foreign creditor banks and domestic debtor banks is possible, though often
difficult, and can result in agreements to allow rollovers, restructuring or temporary
stand-stills on repayments.' 9 In the case of emerging country bonds, collective action
19 An example is Korea's external debt restructuring  arrangement at the end of 1997 through the beginning
of 1998.  The Korean government, representing the interest of Korean commercial banks, negotiated  with
35clauses that would obligate bondholders to accept restructuring, rollovers, or stand-stills
in case of emergencies are particularly important, because coordination with a  large
number  of  bondholders  would  be  almost  impossible  without  such  clauses.  The
mechanisms for coordinated  action by creditors and debtors can help minimize the risk of
moral hazard by requiring both sides to share the burden of losses.
Such processes require private sector burden sharing, both because of limits on
the availability of official resources and because of concerns about moral hazard. The risk
that private debtors and creditors assume is often based on the expectation that official
intervention will reduce the downside risk. As long as official financial intervention is
required at times of crises, private creditors and debtors should bear as fully as possible
the consequences of the risks that they have voluntarily assumed. Official intervention
should not bail them out.
Official stand-still provisions in  the form of a  temporary suspension of debt
payments may be  an essential strategic threat needed to limit investors' moral hazard
(World Bank, 1998a). In addition, this procedure functions as a floodgate that helps stop
the decline in the currency value and enables the authorities to buy time to put in place a
credible  adjustment  program  and  to  organize  creditor-debtor  negotiations.  This
arrangement, if combined with appropriate,  early debt workout agreements, could result
in better  outcomes for both the  debtor economy as a  whole  and  for the  creditors.
However, it may be difficult to adopt a rules-based system because of the diversity of
international  bank creditors to restructure  external debt that was due shortly. The Korean government
provided guarantees for debt payment, and the governments  of major industrialized countries convinced
their banks that the restructuring arrangements  would be in their best interest. The restructuring agreement
restored the confidence  not only in the currency market but also in the financial system, providing a basis
for the subsequent recovery.
36country and market  circumstances. Official debt stand-stills must  be  invoked on  a
country-by-county  basis.
Controls on Capital Outflows. An alternative to the internationally agreed debt
workout is a unilateral control on capital outflows. Outright suspension of convertibility
for  capital account transactions is particularly onerous because producers are rather
quickly shut off from international sources of working capital finance, hampering exports
and domestic productive activities.
Selective  controls on  outflows are  also  problematic, and  failures  outnumber
successes (see Dooley,  1996; World Bank, 2000b). Such controls take the  form of
prohibitions or withholding arrangements on selected types of capital outflows, often
capital invested for less than a specified period, and usually have the objective of keeping
domestic interest rates lower than they would have otherwise have to  be  to prevent
portfolio  shifts  abroad.  Several studies of  outflow restrictions  cast  doubt  on  their
effectiveness  because they can be easy to evade and tend to lose effectiveness over time
as financial agents build surreptitious channels around them (Edwards, 1999; Khan and
Reinhart, 1994, Edison and Reinhart, 1999). For example, companies importing from
subsidiaries abroad can over value imports to  withdraw capital and  evade controls.
Controls on outflows in Malaysia appear to have had a salutary effect in the Malaysian
case, mainly because controls are supported by a strong macroeconomic framework, are
accompanied by bank and corporate restructuring, are short-lived, and are implemented
with credible supervision (see World Bank, 2000a, 2000b, Chapter 3).20  This experience
suggests the IFIs should not reject support of deployment of this instrument categorically,
20 Hood (2000) in his review of Malaysia capital controls concludes: "On balance, it appears that both the
benefits and the costs of the controls have been modest."
37but  rather  should  evaluate  the  probabilities  of  success  in  a  particular  country
circumstance and proposed policy framework. 2
Lesson 6: There is no one size  fits all prescription  for monetary and fiscal policy stance
in response to crisis.
The effects of monetary and fiscal policy had been at the center of the policy debate
during  the  early  phase  of  the  East  Asian  crises.  The  debate  discussed  whether
contractionary monetary and fiscal policy could stabilize financial markets or send the
economy into a profound collapse in output and financial markets.
Monetary policy:  "Your money or your banks. " Contractionary monetary policy
raises domestic interest rates, increases the cost of speculation, and raises the return to
local  currency-denominated assets, all  as a  vehicle to  encourage capital inflows (or
discourage outflows). Moreover, a contractionary monetary policy is a signal to markets
of the government's willingness to defend the exchange rate. However, this creates a
dilemma: High interest rates debilitate a weak banking sector and increase the cost of
borrowing and debt servicing for indebted corporations. 22
21 Hong Kong SAR authorities resorted to the unorthodox measure to contain speculative pressures on the
Hong Kong dollar in August 1998.  That is, in the midst of intense speculation  in the currency and stock
markets, the Hong Kong SAR authorities intervened in the stock market and purchased HK$ 118 billion of
domestic equities in a period of about two weeks. They intervened in the stock market because speculators
shorted the currency  and stock markets simultaneously,  hoping to profit from the lower stock price that
would result from high interest rates to support the exchange rate under the pressure of short selling the
Hong Kong dollar. This intervention was also accompanied  by a variety of measures to strengthen  the
currency board, improve transparency and, more importantly,  increase the cost of speculation in financial
markets (tighter enforcement of rules on short selling and settlement of trades, and higher margin
requirements in the futures markets). Aided by an improvement  in the extemal environment, the
intervention succeeded in calming markets.
22 Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b),  Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Stiglitz (1998), among others,
discuss this point. Stiglitz, for example, argues that a high interest rate policy causes capital outflows and
exchange rate depreciation,  instead of capital inflows and currency appreciation, when it increases  the
probability of bankruptcies in the presence of highly indebted corporations  that have large domestic-
currency debt servicing  obligations. This would weaken domestic banks' balance sheets because
corporations are their major clients.
38Empirical results by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) provide mixed results in the
policy debate. Contractionary monetary policies sometimes trigger dramatic rallies in
financial markets and sometimes generate downturns in  other episodes. In economies
with heavily leveraged corporations and weak banks, tightening monetary policies entails
severe tradeoff between maintaining the value of currencies and maintaining the solvency
of the real and financial sectors. If corporations are highly indebted in domestic currency
(as was the case with Korea), then a high interest rate is detrimental to the corporate
sector. If corporations are highly indebted in foreign currency (as was the case with
Indonesia),  then currency depreciation is detrimental  to corporate health. Governments in
East Asia under these circumstances vacillated between tightening monetary conditions
to protect the exchange rate at the cost of impending systemic bankruptcies and providing
liquidity to  banks that  are stressed at  the  cost  of plummeting exchange rates  and
inflationary surges. 23
Fiscal policy:  "Can  you  finance  it?"  Supporters of a tight  governnent  budget
argue that this generates credibility by signaling to investors a willingness to  combat
inflation, a reduction in the current account deficit (through deflationary adjustment), and
a commitment  to mobilize immediately additional public resources to cover any new debt
burden  that results  from  guaranteeing deposits  and  assuming other  financial sector
liabilities. Others argue that contractionary fiscal policy aggravates the crisis by further
reducing aggregate demand in addition to the effects of the devaluation that usually
23 Other  governments may be compelled  to try to escape this dilemma thorough unorthodox policies that
include closing the capital account, fixing the exchange rate, and even invoking standstills on external debt
payments.
39accompany crises. Reducing net public spending thus intensifies the vulnerabilities  of the
banking and corporate sectors, worsening the emerging crisis. 24
The appropriate policy stance depends on three factors: the cause of the crisis, the
fiscal headroom available pre-crisis, and the willingness of the private sector to lend to
the government. When the crisis country has a favorable fiscal position pre-crisis, low
public  sector debt and  hence credible headroom for fiscal policy,  as  well as  large
domestic savings that can be tapped to finance a budget deficit, the government has the
luxury of a more expansive fiscal policy to support aggregate demand and to provide
leeway to vulnerable banks. On the other hand, when the cause of the crisis is a large
fiscal deficit as in Krugman (1979), fiscal headroom is already exhausted and public debt
is high and government credibility low, fiscal contraction probably cannot be avoided to
bring confidence to the markets.
This suggests  that the best mix of monetary, exchange rate, fiscal, and debt policies
depends on the structure of public and private debt, the degree of external support, and,
importantly,  domestic politics (see Haggard, 2000). There is no single painless policy that
will quickly restore investor confidence.
3. Resolving the Systemic Consequences  of Crises and Contagion
The final structural focus of policymakers should be to strengthen crisis resolution
mechanisms  that  would  create  conditions  for  early  resolution  of  the  systemic
consequences of a crisis and initiation and acceleration of the recovery process.  Such
mechanisms include the establishment  of resolution frameworks of nonviable banks and
24  See Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b). Stiglitz (1999) argues that fiscal contraction during an East
Asian-type  of crisis  would  be a beggar-thyself  policy,  which  is worse  than  the beggar-thy-neighbor  policy
of the 1  930s. Fiscal contraction causes recession in the domestic economy and, as a result, adversely affects
40non-bank  financial  institutions  (NBFIs),  the  strengthening  of  domestic  corporate
insolvency procedures, the development  of international debt-resolution arrangements  (as
mentioned in Lesson 5),and strengthening  the social safety net. The basic frameworks of
these mechanisms need to be put in place before a systemic crisis occurs (i.e., at normal
times) rather than at times of a crisis because their designing and development  take time.
Lesson  7: Move swiftly to establish domestic and international resolution mechanisms
for assets and liabilities of nonviable banks and corporations.
First, experience in  East Asia has shown that domestic procedures of banking
sector resolution were often inadequate. Resolution of weak banks and NBFIs should
involve the following procedures: diagnostic reviews of bank portfolios that are based on
internationally accepted classification rules and accounting principles; identification of
viable  and  nonviable  banks;  resolution  of  nonviable  banks  (liquidation,  closure,
temporary nationalization, merger and acquisition, etc.) with a view to protect depositors,
short-term creditors, and  viable  corporate borrowers; establishment of  official asset
management companies (AMCs) to carve out non-performing loans (NPLs) from weak or
closed financial institutions; and recapitalization of viable banks after full provisioning
and revaluation of NPLs at fair market prices and realistic recovery rates. Emerging
market economies must introduce such resolution procedures so as to effectively resolve
the systematic impacts of a crisis and to accelerate the recovery process.
Second, in East Asia domestic insolvency procedures of corporations were also
often  inadequate for  private  creditors and  debtors to  reach  agreements. Insolvency
procedures  include  the  establishment of  effective  bankruptcy,  reorganization  and
the neighboring countries through trade linkages, which feeds back to the domestic economy and magnifies
the extent of recession through multiplier effects.
41foreclosure laws  for  creditors  wishing  to  take  legal  action  to  recover  assets;  the
elimination of legal and tax impediments to corporate restructuring; the introduction of
"London rules" type, voluntary out-of-court frameworks for corporate restructuring; and
the empowerment of the official AMCs to dispose of and restructure the acquired assets
and/or debtor corporations. The second approach requires providing creditors and debtors
with sufficient incentives (sticks and carrots) to implement voluntary workout through
eliminating legal,  tax,  and  regulatory impediments to  corporate  restructuring. The
development of deep capital markets is also helpful in facilitating corporate restructuring
through securitization of corporate assets and price discovery in the market.
Finally, it is desirable to develop internationally  supported arrangements for orderly
debt workout to  facilitate efficient extemal-debt resolution in the  event that  debtors
become insolvent or cannot meet debt-servicing obligations to  their creditors. These
arrangements would de facto  establish international bankruptcy procedures so as  to
enable debtors and creditors to share the costs of crisis resolution, rather than leaving
borrowers  with all of the consequences.  Though usually costly and time consuming,  these
procedures are critical institutional mechanisms to avoid more costly solutions. As long
as a  country's  private  external debt, particularly corporate debt, is not  resolved, its
banking sector tends to be weak, economic stagnation tends to procrastinate, and the
economic  recovery is likely delayed. The actual process of external-debt workout must be
determined on a  case-by-case basis, rather than on a  rules-based system, because the
specifics of debt conditions are widely different across countries.
Lesson 8: Cushion the effects of crisis on low-income groups through social policies to
ameliorate the inevitable social tensions associated with adjustment.
42The disruption and very large social costs witnessed in the aftermath of economic
crises have highlighted the need to address the social vulnerability exposed by the crisis.
Without  such  attention, the  consequence of  the  crisis  would  be  excessively large
adjustment costs, especially for the poor and the vulnerable segments of society with
long-term, and often irreversible impacts such as the destruction of human capital, of
social institutions, and of political stability. Reduction of social costs and an increase in
resilience to  crisis  require a  broad  approach in  developing countries, spanning the
creation of market insurance against unemployment,  self-insurance (for example, through
protections to individual savings of the poor), to self-protection against becoming poor
(e.g., health insurance and increased education) (see de Ferranti, et al, 2000 and World
Bank, WDR,  2000c). The most important step that each developing country can take is to
establish an institutional framework to  minimize the risks and  severity of economic
downturns at times of crises, and then respond to the particular needs of the poor during
crises.
Policies include:
*  Better information  on the poor and their exposure to economic risk;
*  Targeting of scarce fiscal subsidies on programs for the poor, especially during crisis;
*  Improving evaluation of spending programs to  ensure a positive pro-poor focus,
particularly in education; and
*  Automatic  programs-such  as unemployment  insurance or stay in school programs-
which  provide  more  predictable  institutional  responses to  economic downturn,
regardless of cause.
434. Regional and Global Framework
Although most  attention has  focused on the international and  domestic policy
reforms,  developing  an  effective  regional  framework  can  help  complement  new
international policies and strengthen  domestic policy reforms. This is particularly the case
when economies in a region are increasingly integrated among one another in trade, FDI,
and financial flows through formal arrangements or natural market forces.  It  is thus
important  to improve a regional, in addition to a global, framework.
Lesson 9: Improve mechanisms  for crisis prevention, management, and resolution at
the regional level in a way consistent with improvements in the globalframework.
Because an economic contagion seems to begin with a geographic focus, a regional
framework for financial coordination to  address crisis prevention, management, and
resolution  is  logical.  An  efficient  cooperative  framework  for  regional  financial
management is highly recommended  to cope with serious currency crises, contagion, and
simultaneous economic contraction. 25 At the same time, such a regional framework must
be  consistent with  a  global framework in  order to  secure efficient response to,  and
management and resolution of, future crises because contagion tends to be also global,
particularly in stock markets.
A framework  for regional financial coordination  may include three issues, covering
modalities for regional surveillance  and monitoring for crisis/contagion prevention,
schemes to augment international  liquidity in times of crisis, and programs to assist
25  Some countries  generate more contagion effects than do other countries. Allocating resources to only one
country  in the midst  of a regional  crisis  might  not be very  effective,  because  other  neighboring  countries
may suffer contagion. Moreover, preventing  and containing crises in the countries that generate  more
spillover is relatively more effective to control regional and global shocks.
44crisis-affected  countries to resolve the systemic impact of the crisis and accelerate the
recovery process. 26
First, regional consultation  and economic surveillance/monitoring  is instrumental to
crisis  prevention  at  the  regional  level.  The  process  should  include  exchanges of
macroeconomic  policies and structural information such as fiscal positions, monetary and
exchange rate policies (including domestic and foreign assets and liabilities of the central
banks), capital flows, external debts, financial system conditions, and corporate sector
development. With effective consultation mechanisms in place, each economy in the
region is expected to be under peer pressure so that it is forced to pursue disciplined
macroeconomic  and structural policies that are conductive to stable external accounts and
currencies.
This consultation process may include efforts toward Intra-regional exchange rate
stability for economies that are highly integrated with, or complementary  to, one another
through trade and FDI. These economies may wish to form a currency union (whether
introducing  a  new  common  currency or  adopting an  external  currency  such  as
dollarization and a currency board system), establish a formal mechanism for exchange
rate stability  (such as adopting a formal exchange rate peg to a single external currency or
a basket of such currencies), or support an informal arrangement for stable exchange rates
(such  as  the  de facto  currency stabilization to  the  US  dollar  with  loose  inflation
targeting). 27
See Box 1: Existing Regional Financial Arrangements  in East Asia.
27 See Kawai and Takagi (2000) for East Asia.
45Box 1: Existing Regional Financial Arrangements in East Asia
Several regional arrangements already existed in East Asia prior to the crisis. They included a
network of currency swap arrangements (particularly among the ASEAN countries), bilateral
repurchase agreements, the EMEAP (Executives'  Meeting of  East  Asia and  Pacific Central
Banks), the Four  and  Six Markets Meetings, and  the APEC Finance Ministers Meeting for
financial cooperation  among  finance ministers and/or central  bank  governors.  One  of  the
objectives of these arrangements was to establish a cooperative framework to cope with possible
currency crises through frequent exchanges of information and the network of currency swap and
repurchase arrangements  involving U.S.  dollar-denominated foreign  exchange  reserves.  In
addition to these, various initiatives for regional financial  cooperation emerged following the East
Asian currency crisis.
*  Regional  participation  in  rescue  packages.  At  the  time  of the  baht  and  rupiah crises,
financing by  international financial institutions (the IMF, World  Bank,  and  ADB)  was
supplemented by  bilateral  financing  from  the  regional  economies,  including those  in
emerging  East Asia.
*  Asian Monetary  Fund.  Japan proposed the idea of creating an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)
soon after the Thai baht crisis in July 1997.  But the proposal encountered opposition from the
IMF and the US on the ground that it would undermine an international effort to strengthen
domestic policy reforms on the part of the borrowing countries due to soft conditionalities
associated with  AMF  financing. The  Chinese  government also  opposed  to  what  was
perceived as a Japanese bid for regional financial leadership.
*  Manila  Framework  Group.  Although the  idea of  an  AMF  never materialized, finance
ministers and deputies in the Asia-Pacific region agreed in Manila in November 1997 to
establish  a  forum,  called  the  Manila  Framework  Group  Meeting,  for  cooperative
arrangements supplemented by regional surveillance and financing, in a way consistent with
the IMF/World  Bank framework.
*  The ASEAN  Economic  Monitoring  Process has also been strengthened since the outbreak of a
crisis, supported by the ADB.
*  New  Miyazawa  Initiative.  In  October  1998, Japan  pledged  $30  billion  to  support  the
economic recovery of the crisis-affected countries under the New Miyazawa Initiative. Half
of the pledged amount was to be dedicated to short-termn  capital needs during the process of
implementing economic restructuring and reform, while the rest was earmarked for medium-
term and long-term reforms.
*  AGRI.  In November 1998, the United States and Japan announced the Asian Growth and
Recovery Initiative (AGRI) to stimulate economic recovery and growth. With support from
the World Bank and the ADB, AGRI was to mobilize $5 billion in bilateral and multilateral
support to further corporate restructuring and restore access to capital.
*  Chiang  Mai  Initiative:  ASEAN+3. In May 2000, the ASEAN countries, Japan, Korea, and
China (ASEAN plus 3) agreed to form a network of currency swap arrangements to prevent
currency crises in the region. The swap lines are still at a  very premature stage and the
conditions under which swaps would be activated have yet to be negotiated. The ASEAN+3
arrangements are said to be complementary to the IMF, by providing short-term bridging
assistance until an IMF program can be put into place. China's change in approach and its
participation  poses a question how Japan and China might share leadership responsibilities.
46Second, global sources of international  liquidity may be delayed in disbursement in
times of crisis or contagion, whether because of bureaucratic processes or disagreements
over policy conditionality. To  avoid long delays and to  augment globally available
resources, a regional financing facility can help close the gap. A financing facility that
can mobilize large amounts of liquidity rapidly to head off currency crises and contagion
is an obvious benefit if crises and contagion are most likely to be the result of irrational
herd  behavior. The  regional  initiative, however, needs  to  be  consistent with,  and
complementary  to, a global framework to exploit the synergy, ensure international policy
coherence, and involve private creditors who are very often financial institutions from
outside the region.
Third, in the face of a systemic crisis in the banking, corporate and social sectors,
mobilizing fiscal resources is essential to quickly resolving the crisis. Fiscal resources
that are needed to recapitalize weak banks, facilitate corporate debt restructuring, and
increase social safety net spending may be limited due to the lack of fiscal headroom or
constraints to external financing on market terms. Given that the resources from the
multilateral development banks (such as the World Bank and the ADB) are also limited,
regionally concerted  action  to  mobilize  such resources, particularly  from  the  core
countries in a region, would contribute greatly to crisis resolution, if done consistently
with global frameworks.
47Box 2: Global Initiatives to Improve the International Financial System
Initiatives now under consideration as part of the intemational financial architecture discussions
have the potential to improve the global framework and policy response. Areas under discussion
include:
*  Inforrmation  and transparency:  The World Bank and IMF among others have been working on
new standards for disseminating data on reserves and extemal debt and on new codes of good
practices in fiscal, monetary, and financial  disclosure.
*  Banking and supervision: Work is ongoing to strengthen Basle core principles. The World
Bank and IMF are conducting  joint assessments of financial systems to ascertain compliance
with new international norms and detect extant weaknesses.
*  Securities markets: The International Organization of Securities Commissions has prepared
principles and standards for disclosure.
*  Accounting and auditing: The Intemational Accounting Standards Committee is reviewing
principles with the objective of having uniform standards  by 2002.
*  Bankruptcy and  govemance:  The  U.N.  Comrnission on  Intemational  Trade  Law  has
disseminated a new mode law of cross-border insolvency, and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development  Task Force is working on internationally applicable principles
of corporate govemance.
*  Private sector involvement: The IMF and its Board, among others, have been working on
general principles to elicit greater private participation in financing packages, in part because
IMF resources are  limited and  in part to  discourage the "moral  hazard" that  could be
associated with bail outs.
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